Understanding money demand is important for our comprehension of macroeconomics and monetary policy. Its instability has made this a challenge. Common explications for the instability are …nancial regulations and …nancial innovations that shift the money demand function. We provide a complementary view by showing that a model where borrowers have limited commitment can signi…cantly improve the …t between the theoretical money demand function and the data. Limited commitment can also explain why the ratio of credit to M1 is currently so low, despite that nominal interest rates are at their lowest recorded levels. In a low interest rate environment, incentives to default are high and so credit constraints bind tightly, which depresses credit activities.
Introduction
Monetary theory suggests a stable negative relationship between money demand and nominal interest rates. However, for many countries this relationship is unstable and standard models fail to replicate it. For example, consider the empirical money demand curve for the United Kingdom displayed in Figure 1 . We use the Lucas (2000) methodology to …t the curve and …nd that both speci…cations, the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations, fail to explain the ‡at parts of the money demand curve at low interest rates (between 2 and 4 percent) and high interest rates (between 6 and 12 percent). It
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Figure 1: U.K. money demand
In this paper, we show that limited commitment can signi…cantly improve the …t between the theoretical money demand curve and the data for several developed economies, compared to a model that assumes full commitment. We derive the demand for money in a microfounded monetary model and we analyze and calibrate it under two competing assumptions: Either agents can commit to repay their loans (full commitment) or they cannot (limited commitment). Limited commitment a¤ects the shape of the money demand curve, because it gives rise to an endogenous borrowing constraint, which depends on monetary policy in an interesting way, as explained below.
We model limited commitment under the assumption that the punishment, for an agent who does not repay his loan, is permanent exclusion from borrowing and saving. 2 A borrower, thus, faces a classic trade-o¤: The short-term utility gain from not repaying his debt versus the discounted sum of utility losses from not being able to access …nancial markets in the future. Financial intermediaries understand this trade o¤ and are only willing to provide credit up to an endogenous upper-bound. This bound is the largest loan size that a borrower will pay back voluntarily. Figure 2 displays the empirical money demand curve for the United Kingdom and our best …t calibrations for the models with full commitment and limited commitment. The calibration under full commitment (the blue curve) generates comparable results to those using the Lucas methodology presented in Figure 1 . It also shows that our model with limited commitment (the red curve) achieves a signi…cantly better …t (see Table 2 for further statistical details). With limited commitment, we identify four regions in our theory and display them in Figure 2 . To understand these regions, note that there are two nominal interest rates in the model. One interest rate re ‡ects the opportunity cost of holding money (captured by the U.K. 10-year government bond rate, in Figure 2 ) and the other one is the nominal interest rate at which agents can borrow (called the borrowing rate, which is not displayed in Figure 2 ).
Region I: For low opportunity costs of holding money (2 to 5.3 percent), the incentive to default is high. Consequently, the borrowing constraint is tightly binding and there is almost no borrowing. As a consequence, the 'e¤ective'demand for loans is very low, and since the supply of loans is inelastic, the equilibrium borrowing rate is very low. 3 Region II: For low-to-intermediate opportunity costs (5.3 to 5.8 percent), borrowing is rapidly increasing and the demand for money is decreasing. The reason is that an increase in the opportunity cost relaxes the borrowing constraint. Agents are able to borrow more and, for that reason, reduce their money holdings. Note that in this region, the 'e¤ective'demand for loans continues to be small and the borrowing rate remains low. Region III: For intermediate opportunity costs (5.8 to 9.5 percent), borrowing and money demand are increasing simultaneously in the opportunity cost of holding money. In this region, the borrowing constraint is still binding and so an increase in the opportunity cost of holding money relaxes the borrowing constraint and increases borrowing. In contrast to Region II, the demand for money is increasing, because the interest rate at which agents can borrow is increasing faster than the opportunity cost of holding money. Region IV: For high opportunity costs (more than 9.5 percent), the incentive to default is low, because the opportunity cost of holding money is high. Consequently, borrowing is unconstrained. Furthermore, the demand for money is decreasing in the opportunity cost of holding money.
Our model implies that there is a positive correlation between nominal interest rates and credit activity. At …rst glance, this positive relationship appears counter-intuitive, as one might think that people want to borrow more when interest rates are low than when they are high. However, this intuition misses the fact that, because of limited commitment, they might receive substantially less credit than they demand when interest rates are low. For the United Kingdom, we observe a positive correlation between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates of 0:93 for the private non…nancial sector, while our model estimates a value of 0:89. The positive correlation in the data suggests that limited commitment is indeed an issue for the United Kingdom. Models that assume full commitment of borrowers have a hard time to replicate such a strong positive correlation between nominal interest rates and credit activity.
Limited commitment can thus deliver an explanation for the "liquidity trap", as de…ned by Keynes: "There is a possibility that after the rate of interest has fallen to a certain level, liquidity-preference may become virtually absolute in the sense that almost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate of interest." -Keynes (1936).
Our theory of limited commitment is consistent with the above quotation from Keynes (1936) , where he observes that in a low interest rate environment agents do not want to hold debt. Our theory provides a rationale for this: In a low interest rate environment, agents (savers) do not want to hold debt (provide loans), because a borrower's incentive to default is high. It is also in accordance with the fact that although currently nominal interest rates are at their lowest recorded levels, credit activity is very low.
In order to …nd out how limited commitment a¤ects money demand in other countries beside the United Kingdom, we also calibrate our model to Australia, Canada and the United States. Australia and Canada strengthen our conclusion that limited commitment can play an important role in explaining the behavior of money demand in the post-1980s period. For the United States, we do not …nd that limited commitment improves the …t compared to a model with full commitment. To understand this di¤erence better, we study an alternative punishment scheme. Numerically, we binds tightly, and so the 'e¤ective'demand for credit is low.
…nd that, under this alternative punishment scheme, the model can generate the same allocation as that of an economy where agents can fully commit to repay their debt.
Literature review
Understanding money demand is important for our comprehension of macroeconomics and monetary policy. Common explications for the instability of money demand are …nancial regulations and …nancial innovations that shift the money demand function (see the discussion of the literature below). We provide a complementary view by showing that limited commitment can improve the …t between the theoretical money demand function and the data. Our attempt, here, is to explore how far one can get by focusing on limited commitment only. In reality, …nancial innovation, …nancial regulation, and limited commitment a¤ect money demand simultaneously over time.
There are countless theoretical papers and many more empirical investigations on money demand. 4 Perhaps, one of the reasons for this interest is the strong connection between money demand and the quantity theory of money. As Milton Friedman phrases it, "the quantity theory is in the …rst instance a theory of the demand for money" (Friedman, 1956, p.4) . Hence, studying the behavior of the money demand function is important to understand the validity of the quantity theory, and its monetary policy implications. 5 Meltzer (1963) was one of the …rst to document a stable relationship between the demand for money and interest rates using U.S. data. Lucas (1988) reviewed and con…rmed, theoretically and empirically, Meltzer's (1963) results by extending the analysis to more recent data. The model estimated by Lucas (1988) , however, does not work well after the mid-1980s, as we document above. In the literature, there are basically two approaches to address the instability of the money demand function. Some researchers construct models, where …nancial innovations a¤ect the shape of the money demand function -without changing its de…nition. Others are working on more accurate de…-nitions of money demand. Both approaches are related since the …nancial sector constantly innovates new money-like assets, and so the economics of monetary aggregates have changed considerably over time.
In an empirical work, Reynard's (2004) studies the e¤ects of …nancial innovations on money demand. He observes that …nancial market participation increased substantially in the 1970s, and argues that this is the main determinant of the downward shift in the money demand function and its higher interest rate elasticity in the United States. Along the same lines, but in a calibrated model with a microfounded money demand curve, Berentsen et al. (2015) study how …nancial innovations a¤ect the money demand curve in the United States. They assume full commitment, while in this paper we investigate the e¤ects of limited commitment on the shape of the money demand curve.
Teles and Zhou (2005), Ireland (2009), and Lucas and Nicolini (2015) emphasize that the instability of money demand is due to a measurement problem. Deregulation of the …nancial sector in the 1980s and …nancial innovations in the 1990s have changed the role of M1, which is the monetary aggregate typically used to calculate the money demand function. For example, Teles and Zhou (2005) show that, prior to the 1980s, there was a clear distinction between M1 and M2. Assets assigned to M1 could be used in transactions, but yielded zero interest, while M2 assets yielded a positive interest, but were illiquid. Since the 1980s, some M2 assets could also be used for transactions. To circumvent this problem, Teles and Zhou (2005) split the data into two sub-periods, 1900-1979 and 1980-2003 . They use M1 to measure the money demand for the …rst sub-period and the money zero maturity aggregate (MZM) for the second sub-period. 6 They …nd that the long-run stability of the money demand is re-established when M1 is used for the period 8 Our analysis is complementary to all studies discussed above, as none of them looks at the role of limited commitment on the shape of the money demand curve.
While writing this paper, we read several studies on the U.K. money demand. Most of these studies are empirical and date back, at least, to Brown (1939) . More recent studies comprise, but are not limited to, Friedman and Schwartz (1982) , Hendry and Ericsson (1991) , and Drake (1996) . Most of these studies are of an empirical nature and the main focus is parameter constancy, which is well documented in Judd and Scadding (1982) and Goldfeld and Sichel (1990) . As pointed out by Ericsson (1998, p.299) , "Non-constancy of estimated coe¢ cients presents both economic and statistical di¢ culties in conducting any inferences from the empirical model." Thus, when the economic allocation changes over time, because constraints that are slack become binding, previously estimated models may become misspeci…ed, and their nonconstancy is traced back to omitted variables.
Finally, our paper belongs to the so called "New Monetarist Economics" literature. In this literature, money is valuable, because of the existence of frictions that make it useful as a payment instrument (Lagos and Wright, 2005) . Furthermore, …nancial intermediation of money (borrowing and saving) is essential, because it improves the allocation (Berentsen et al., 2007 ). An extensive and up-to-date discussion of this literature can be found in Williamson 
Environment
The basic setup follows Berentsen et al. (2015) . The main di¤erence is that we relax the full commitment assumption for …nancial transactions and study the implication of limited commitment on the shape of the money demand function. 10 There is a measure [0; 1] of agents who live forever in discrete time. In each period, there are three markets that open and close sequentially. In the …rst market, agents can borrow and deposit money; in the second market, production and consumption of a specialized good takes place; in the third market, credit contracts are settled and a general good is produced and consumed. We call these markets money market, goods market, and centralized market, respectively. All goods are perfectly perishable in the sense that their value goes to zero if they are not consumed in the market where they are produced. This assumption rules out any form of commodity money. Finally, we assume that all goods are perfectly divisible.
At the beginning of each period, agents receive two idiosyncratic shocks. A preference shock determines whether an agent can consume or produce in the goods market: he can produce but not consume with probability n, or he can consume but not produce with probability 1 n. We refer to producers and consumers as sellers and buyers, respectively. An entry shock determines whether an agent participates in the money market: he has access to the money market with probability , or he does not have access with probability 1
. We refer to agents who have access as active, and to agents who do not as passive.
In the goods market, buyers and sellers are matched according to the following reduced-form matching function, M (n; 1 n), where M denotes the number of matches in a period. We assume that M (n; 1 n) has constant returns to scale, and is continuous and increasing with respect to each of its arguments. The probability that a buyer is matched with a seller in the goods market is denoted by (n) = M (n; 1 n) (1 n) 1 , while the probability that a seller is matched with a buyer is denoted by s (n) = (n) (1 n) n 1 . To simplify on notation, we shorten (n) and s (n) as and s , respectively. A buyer enjoys utility u(q) from consuming q units of the specialized good, where u(q) satis…es the following properties: u 0 (q) > 0, u 00 (q) < 0, u 0 (0) = 1, and u 0 (1) = 0. A seller incurs a disutility c (q) = q from producing q units of the specialized good. There is no record-keeping technology, and agents are anonymous in this market. This implies that a buyer's promise to pay for his purchased goods in the future is not credible, hence trades must be settled immediately. Consequently, a medium of exchange is needed for transactions.
The centralized market is a frictionless market where agents can produce and consume a general good. No medium of exchange is needed for transactions in this market. Agents receive utility U (x) from consuming x units of the general good, where U (x) has the following properties: U 0 (x), U 00 (x) > 0, U 0 (0) = 1, and U 0 (1) = 0. They produce the general good according to a linear technology that transforms h hours of work into h units of the general good, su¤ering disutility h. Agents cannot communicate with each other, and their actions are not publicly observed in this market. Agents discount between, but not within, periods. Let 2 (0; 1) be the discount factor between two consecutive periods and let r (1 ) 1 denote the real interest rate. There exists a perfectly storable, divisible, intrinsically useless object in the economy, called money. Its supply evolves according to the law of motion M t+1 = M t , where denotes the gross growth rate of money, and M t the stock of money in period t. Also, there exists a central bank which injects (withdraws) money through a lump-sum transfer T t to all agents in the centralized market, where
To economize on notation, we shorten t + 1 and t 1 as +1 and 1, respectively.
Perfectly competitive …nancial intermediaries, or banks, take deposits and make loans in the money market. Agents access this market after they learn their type (buyer or seller), but before they enter the goods market. Buyers and sellers have di¤erent liquidity needs in the money market: Buyers need more money than they have since they want to consume in the goods market, while sellers have excess money holdings since they can only produce. This generates a role for banks who can reallocate money from those who need less (sellers) to those who need more (buyers). Deposit and loan contracts are redeemed at the end of each period, in the centralized market. Banks also operate a costless, record-keeping technology of all …nancial transactions, but they cannot enforce loan repayment in the centralized market. Because of the record-keeping technology, banks perfectly know each agent's identity and credit history, but not his trade history. Finally, banks are perfectly competitive, which implies that the money market rate i m is the same for depositors and lenders.
Finally, monetary policy consists of choosing a constant money growth rate . Let i be the nominal interest rate on a one-period bond acquired in the centralized market that pays the principal plus the nominal interest rate i in the next period's centralized market. 11 The interest rate i on this bond constitutes the opportunity cost of holding money across periods. It is well known that in this class of models, the Fisher equation holds: that is, i = ( )= . From the Fisher equation, it is evident that the central bank controls the nominal interest rate i, and we will therefore express many of our equations in terms of i, instead of . Furthermore, we sometimes refer to i as the policy rate to make the connection to monetary policy more evident.
Agents'Decisions
We now describe the agent's decision problem in each market. To do so, we proceed backwards from the centralized market to the money market.
The centralized market. In the centralized market, agents play di¤erent roles. First, they can consume and produce a general good, x. Second, they redeem their …nancial contracts: A seller receives money plus interest from his deposits, while a buyer pays back his loan plus interest. For now, we assume buyers always honor their obligations in the centralized market. Later in the paper, we relax this assumption and derive conditions such that loan repayment is voluntary under di¤erent punishment schemes. Agents receive a lump-sum money transfer from the central bank, and choose the amount of money to take into the next period.
Let V 3 (m;`; d) be the value function of an agent entering the centralized market with m units of money,`units of loans, and d units of deposits. Then, the agent's problem in the centralized market is
subject to the budget constraint
where denotes the price of money in terms of the general good, and h denotes hours of work. A standard result in this literature is that the choice of m +1 is independent of m. This result comes from the quasi-linearity assumption in the consumption function and implies that the distribution of money holdings is degenerate at the end of each period. This makes the analysis analytically tractable.
The goods market. Let (q; z) be the terms of trade agreed within a meeting in the goods market, where q is the amount of goods produced by the seller and z is the amount of money exchanged in the meeting. The terms of trade (q; z) are determined using the Kalai, or proportional, solution to the bargaining problem, which is as follows: 12
where denotes the bargaining power of a buyer. The equality constraint is the Kalai constraint, which determines how a buyer and a seller split the total surplus from trade, u(q) q. The buyer receives the fraction of this surplus. 13 The inequality constraint is the buyer's cash constraint according to which a buyer cannot o¤er the seller more money than he has. If the buyer's cash constraint binds (i.e., m = z), then the solution to the above problem is
If the buyer's constraint does not bind (i.e., m > z), then q = q , and z = m = g(q ) , where q
The value function of a buyer entering the goods market with m units of money and`units of
With probability , he has a match with a seller in the goods market, in which case he enjoys utility u (q) from consuming q units of the specialized good. The possibility to consume reduces his continuation value by z units of money. With probability 1 , he has no match in the goods market and waits for the centralized market to open. Note that active buyers never deposit money, so d = 0.
The value function of a seller in the goods market is
With probability , a seller has a match and incurs a disutility c (q) = q in exchange for z units of money. Note that active sellers never borrow money; i.e.,`= 0.
The money market. In the money market, an agent can deposit or borrow money at the bank. The money market opens at the beginning of each period after agents learn their type (buyer or seller). Before the money market opens, agents also learn whether they will have access to this market or not. After agents have deposited and borrowed money, the money market closes. Let V b 1 (m) be the value function of an active buyer entering the money market with m units of money, and let V s 1 (m) be that of an active seller. Also, let V b 2 (m; 0) and V s 2 (m; 0) be the respective value functions of a passive buyer and a passive seller, entering the goods market. Since passive agents do not participate in the money market, they enter the goods market with no credit contract; i.e.,`= d = 0. Then, the value function of an agent at the beginning of each period is
An agent in the money market is an active buyer with probability (1 n), an active seller with probability n, a passive buyer with probability (1 ) (1 n), and a passive seller with probability (1 ) n. A passive agent can neither lend nor borrow money at the bank. Hence, he just waits for the goods market to open.
Loan repayment in the centralized market is voluntary in the sense that a buyer repays his loan if, and only if, it is pro…table for him to do so. Sellers have no obligation in the centralized market (they receive money from the bank), so default is not an issue for them. In order to create an incentive for the buyer to repay his debt, we assume some form of punishment for those who default. In particular, we assume permanent exclusion from the money market for defaulters. Note that banks perfectly know the identity of the defaulters and can (will) always refuse to trade with them. Hence, permanent exclusion from the money market can be implemented. We will study an alternative punishment scheme later.
A buyer who decides to default on his debt enjoys a bene…t and su¤ers a cost for doing so. On the one hand, he has to work fewer hours in the centralized market, since he does not have to repay his debt plus interest. On the other hand, he will consume less in all future periods, since he can no longer borrow or lend money, and thus cannot insure himself against adverse liquidity shocks. If the cost associated with the punishment is higher than the bene…t, a deviation is not pro…table, and the buyer honors his obligation.
In what follows, we denote all quantities associated with a defaulter by a tilde " e ", and all quantities associated with an active agent by a hat "^". Quantities without a superscript refer to passive agents. Also, let `denote the borrowing limit, which is the maximum amount of real borrowing that is compatible with voluntary repayment. A bank will never lend more than `to a buyer, since this would trigger a strategic default in the centralized market. The conditions that make debt repayment voluntarily in a steady state are derived in the Appendix, and we rewrite them in the following 14 Lemma 1 A buyer repays his loan if, and only if,
with
whereq satis…es
The endogenous borrowing limit `has an intuitive interpretation. The …rst term on the righthand side re ‡ects the utility bene…t of not repaying the loan. The second term is the utility loss of having no access to …nancial markets in the future. To see this, note that
] is the expected utility surplus of having access to the money market in a given period, and [u (q) g (q)] is the expected utility surplus from having no access.
To derive some comparative static results for the borrowing limit `, it is convenient to use (7) to rewrite (6) as follows:
A change in the policy rate i a¤ects the borrowing limit `through changes of the consumption quantities q,q andq, and changes of the money market rate i m . These general equilibrium e¤ects are highly nonlinear and it is di¢ cult to derive analytical results. 15 Nevertheless, we can deduce the following partial equilibrium e¤ects: An increase in the real interest rate r decreases the borrowing limit, because it reduces the discounted utilities from future surpluses. An increase in the matching probability of the goods market increases the borrowing limit, because it increases the probability of trading and hence expected future utilities. An increase in the probability of becoming a buyer 1 n increases the borrowing limit, because it makes it more important to have access to the money market. Finally, an exogenous increase in the money market rate i m reduces `, because it makes it more costly to use the money market. At this point, we can write an agent's maximization problem in the money market. An active buyer's problem in the money market is
subject to the borrowing constraint (5). It is easy to check that active buyers borrow in the money market, since they have high liquidity needs (they want to consume in the goods market). The real amount of money a buyer can borrow may or may not be constrained depending on which equilibrium the economy ends up with. An active seller's problem in the money market is
where the constraint in (9) means that a seller cannot deposit more money than the amount he has. Unlike buyers, sellers deposit money and do not borrow in the money market, since they have low liquidity needs in the sense that they do not consume in the goods market.
Monetary Steady State Equilibrium
Throughout the paper, we focus on monetary steady state equilibria where all real quantities are constant and money is valued. 16 In any monetary steady state equilibrium, the marginal value of money satis…es the following expression (see the Appendix for the derivation):
This expression is derived from the …rst-order condition for the choice of money holdings in the centralized market. It requires that the marginal cost of acquiring a unit of money (the nominal interest rate i) is equal to the expected marginal bene…t of spending it: With probability (1 n), the agent becomes an active buyer, and the expected utility from spending it is
; with probability n, the agent becomes an active seller and can earn the money market rate i m ; with probability (1 ) (1 n), the agents becomes a passive buyer, and obtains the expected utility h
from spending it; and with probability (1 ) n, he becomes a passive seller who gets no utility.
There are two critical constraints in the model that can be used to characterize the monetary equilibrium allocation as a function of the policy rate i: The borrowing constraint (5) and the seller's cash constraint (9) . Let be the Lagrange multiplier on the buyer's borrowing constraint (5), and
Types
In a type-0 equilibrium, active sellers do not deposit all their money ( s = 0), and the buyer's borrowing constraint is not binding ( = 0). A type-0 equilibrium is characterized by the following Proposition 1 A type-0 equilibrium is a list i m ;q;q; q; `; ` satisfying equations (6), (7), (10), and
Equations (6) and (7) are derived and explained in Lemma 1 and refer to the borrowing limit of an active buyer and the consumption quantity of a defaulter, respectively. Equation (10) equates the marginal cost of holding money to the marginal expected bene…t of spending it and is explained above. Equation (11) requires that the real amount of money that an active buyer spends in the goods market, g(q), is equal to the real amount of money spent as a passive buyer, g(q), plus the real loan an active buyer obtains from the bank, `. This equation is derived from the active buyer's budget constraint and immediately implies that active buyers never consume less than passive buyers (q q). Equation (12) is the …rst-order condition for the choice of borrowing in the money market. Active buyers are not borrowing-constrained in a type-0 equilibrium, which means that they borrow exactly up to the point where the marginal cost of borrowing an additional unit of money (left-hand side) is equal to the marginal bene…t (right-hand side). Also, since i m = 0, active buyers consume the …rst-best quantity of goods (q = q ). In contrast, from (10), passive buyers consume an ine¢ cient quantity (q < q ) unless i = 0. Finally, for s = 0 to hold, sellers must be indi¤erent between depositing their money and not depositing it. This can be the case if, and only if, (13) holds.
In a type-I or a type-II equilibrium, active sellers do not deposit all their money ( s = 0) and the borrowing constraint is binding ( > 0). As for the type-0 equilibrium, this is only possible if i m = 0. A type-I or a type-II equilibrium is characterized by the following Proposition 2 A type-I or a type-II equilibrium is a list fi m ;q;q; q; `; `g satisfying (6), (7), (10) , and
All equations in Proposition 2 have the same meaning as their counterparts in Proposition 1, except for (15) which di¤ers from (12) . In a type-I or a type-II equilibrium, an active buyer is borrowing-constrained. The bank knows that `> `will trigger a default, hence it lends the buyer exactly `. In this case, the marginal value of borrowing is higher than its marginal cost. Consequently, the …rst-order condition for the choice of borrowing (12) is replaced by the borrowing constraint (15) .
The system of equations in Proposition 2 admits at least one solution which is the straightforward solutionq = q =q. To see this, assumeq = q. Then, from (14) , it holds that `= 0. Furthermore, (10) collapses to (7), implying thatq =q. This means that the two terms on the right-hand side of (6) are both zero, and, thus, `= 0. Therefore, we conclude that the above-mentioned quantities are equilibrium quantities, and we call this solution the type-I equilibrium. We cannot show analytically that other solutions exists for equations (6) , (7), (10) , and (14)- (16) . However, we identify numerically a solution with q >q > q and `= `> 0, where q solves u 0 (q ) = g 0 (q ). We call this solution the type-II equilibrium.
To summarize, in a type-I equilibrium, the money market interest rate is zero (i m = 0), borrowing is constrained and the borrowing limit is equal to zero ( `= `= 0), and both active and passive buyers consume the same ine¢ cient quantity of goods in the goods market (q = q < q ). In a type-II equilibrium, the money market interest rate is zero (i m = 0), borrowing is constrained and the borrowing limit is strictly positive ( `= `> 0), and active buyers consume more than passive buyers in the goods market (q >q > q).
In a type-III equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money at the bank ( s > 0), and the active buyer's borrowing constraint is binding ( > 0). A type-III equilibrium is characterized by the following Proposition 3 A type-III equilibrium is a list i m ;q;q; q; `; ` satisfying (6), (7), (10), and
All the equations in Proposition 3 have the same meaning as their counterparts in Proposition 2, except that (16) is now replaced by (19) . Equation (19) is the money market clearing condition which is derived under the condition that sellers supply all their money. It holds in this type of equilibrium, because i m > 0. It does not hold in Proposition 2, because sellers do not deposit all their money.
In a type-IV equilibrium, active sellers deposit all their money ( s > 0), and the buyer's borrowing constraint is not binding ( = 0). A type-IV equilibrium is characterized by the following Proposition 4 A type-IV equilibrium is a list i m ;q;q; q; `; ` satisfying (6), (7), (10) , and
All the equations in Proposition 4 have the same meaning as the respective equations in Proposition 3, except that (18) is now replaced by (21) . The meaning of equation (21) is the following. Unlike in a type-III equilibrium, active buyers are not borrowing-constrained in a type-IV equilibrium, which means that they borrow exactly up to the point where the marginal cost of borrowing an additional unit of money (left-hand side) is equal to the marginal bene…t (right-hand side). Consequently, we replace the borrowing constraint (18) with the …rst-order condition for the choice of borrowing (21).
Sequence
We …nd the following sequence of equilibria as the nominal interest rate i increases from 0 to in…nity: type-0, type-I, type-II, type-III, and type-IV. Let i 0 be the value of i that separates the type-0 from the type-I equilibrium, i 1 be the value of i that separates the type-I from the type-II equilibrium, i 2 the value of i that separates the type-II from the type-III equilibrium, and i 3 the value of i that separates the type-III from the type-IV equilibrium. This sequence of equilibria is summarized in the following table. 
The critical values are derived by identifying at which values of i the di¤erent types of equilibria generate the same allocation. First, numerically we …nd that the type-0 equilibrium only exists when i = 0. 17 Furthermore, the allocation in the type-0 and type-I equilibria are identical at i = 0. Hence, we …nd that i 0 = 0 is the value of i that separates these two types of equilibria. Second, i 1 is the value of i such that `= 0 in a type-II equilibrium. Consequently, the type-I and the type-II allocations are identical at i = i 1 . Third, i 2 is the value of i that solves i m = 0 in a type-III equilibrium. Consequently, the type-II and the type-III allocations are identical at i = i 2 . Fourth, i 3 is the value of i such that i m = [u 0 (q)=g 0 (q) 1] in a type-III equilibrium. Consequently, the type-III and the type-IV allocations are identical at i = i 3 .
Finally, note that in Figure 2 in the introduction we have identi…ed regions I, II, III, and IV. These regions are characterized by the type-I, type-II, type-III, and type-IV equilibria, respectively. Also, the dotted vertical lines correspond to the critical values i 1 , i 2 , and i 3 , respectively. In Figure  2 , they are calculated according to our best-…t calibration, which we will present further below.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of partial access to borrowing and saving, compare the allocations under full and limited commitment, and analyze the model under an alternative punishment scheme. Finally, we look at the liquidity trap.
Full access vs partial access
Before discussing the role of partial access on consumed quantities, let us derive the money demand function. To do this, let us de…ne the real output in the goods market and in the centralized market.
The real output in the goods market is
, where m = g(q) and M 1 = m = g(q), while the real output in the centralized market is Y CM = A for U (x) = A log(x). Accordingly, the total real output of the economy is Y = Y GM + Y CM ; and the model-implied money demand is
Note that, from the quantity theory of money, money demand is de…ned to be the inverse of the velocity of money; i.e., MD =1=V = M 1 =P Y . Using P = 1= , we obtain (23).
The two top diagrams in Figure 3 display the quantities of specialized goods consumed by an active buyer,q, a passive buyer, q, and a deviator,q, as a function of the opportunity cost of holding money, i. The two bottom diagrams display money demand, MD, as a function of i. The diagrams on the left-hand side refer to the case where all agents have access to the money market ( = 1). In this case, there are no passive agents, and a buyer can either be active, in which case he will consumeq, or be banned from trading in the money market (because he defaulted), in which case he will consumeq. The diagrams on the right-hand side refer to the case where access to the money market is partial (0 < < 1). We also display money demand for = 0, where the money market is inactive and consumption is the same for all buyers. Let us look at the limited participation case; i.e., at the top-right diagram in Figure 3 . In a type-I equilibrium (0 i i 1 ), there is no credit since `= `= 0. Accordingly, the quantities of goods consumed by active and passive agents are equal. Furthermore, they equal the quantity consumed by a deviator and are decreasing in i. In this regime, money demand is high and decreasing in i. It is high, because there is no credit available and so agents want to hold large quantities of money in order to self-insure against the liquidity shocks (buyer/seller shock). Money demand is decreasing in i, because i is the opportunity cost of holding money. This is the classical real balance e¤ect which is sometimes also referred to as the in ‡ation tax e¤ect.
In the type-II equilibrium (i 1 i i 2 ), borrowing is strictly positive and constrained, since `= `> 0. Consequently,q > q. 18 Consumption of active agents is increasing in i, while consumption of passive agents is decreasing. The reason whyq is increasing is that the borrowing constraint relaxes as i increases. This allows active agents to borrow and consume more. Consumption of passive agents, q, is falling for the following reason: As i increases, more credit becomes available, and so the demand for money falls. To restore equilibrium, the value of money falls. This reduces the purchasing power of the passive agents (active agents can undo this by obtaining more credit) and so they consume less. In this region, money demand is rapidly decreasing in i for two reasons. First as in region I, because the opportunity cost of holding money i increases. Second, cheap credit is available. Thus, the opportunity to borrow provides insurance against liquidity shocks (buyer/seller and active/passive shocks) and so agents reduce their demand for money relative to a situation where no such opportunity exists.
In the type-III equilibrium (i 2 i i 3 ), there is also constrained borrowing, since since `= `> 0. Consumption quantities of active and passive agents are increasing in i. As in the type-II equilibrium,q is increasing because the borrowing constraint relaxes as i increases, and so active agents can borrow more. In contrast to the type-II equilibrium, q is also increasing. The reason is that in this region, the marginal borrowing cost, as represented by the borrowing interest rate i m , increases rapidly. In fact, i m is increasing faster than i. Because i m increase faster than i, the demand for money increases. To restore the equilibrium, the value of money increases, which explains why the consumption of passive agents, q, is also increasing in i.
Finally, for i i 3 , the type-IV equilibrium exists, where borrowing is unconstrained, and the consumption of active and passive agents is decreasing in i. Consumption quantities are decreasing here, because the value of money decreases when the opportunity cost of money increases.
Let us now look at the full participation case; i.e., = 1. If all agents can participate in the money market, the type-I equilibrium occurs if 0 i i 1 = i 2 . 19 When the marginal cost of holding money is su¢ ciently low (0 i i 1 = i 2 ), the bene…t of participating in the money market is small, since agents can cheaply insure themselves against liquidity shocks by holding money. Consequently, an active buyer's incentive to default is high and so `= `= 0. In this region, the allocation is the same as the one of an economy without a money market. When = 1, the type-II equilibrium is degenerate since i 1 = i 2 . The type-III equilibrium occurs for i 1 = i 2 i i 3 . In this case, `andq are increasing in i. The reason for this is that an increase in the opportunity cost of holding money relaxes the borrowing constraint, allowing the active buyer to borrow more, and thus to consume more. Finally, the type-IV equilibrium occurs for i i 3 . In this case, borrowing is unconstrained and the quantities of goods consumed by active buyers and defaulting buyers are decreasing in i because of the standard in ‡ation-tax argument.
Full commitment vs limited commitment
In Berentsen et al. (2015), we derive the same model under the assumption of full commitment. In that paper, we …nd that the following sequence of equilibria prevails: For 0 i i F , prices and quantities are described by the type-0 equilibrium and for i F i, prices and quantities are described by the type-IV equilibrium. The critical value i F is the value of i such thatq = q in a type-IV equilibrium. It becomes clear, that the underlying assumption about commitment strongly a¤ects the equilibrium quantities, which is shown in Figure 4 below.
Figure 4: Full commitment vs. limited commitment
The diagram on the left-hand side of Figure 4 shows the consumed quantities under full commitment, while the diagram on the right-hand side displays the allocation under limited commitment. We have discussed the latter further above. One can show that for i < i 3 the consumed quantities under limited commitment are lower than the ones under full commitment, since agents are borrowing-constrained. For i i 3 , the quantities are the same. With full commitment, in the type-0 equilibrium, q <q = q . In this region, the demand for loans is small, because the opportunity cost of holding money is small and so buyers bring enough real balances into the period to guarantee an almost e¢ cient consumption quantity. Active buyers then use the money market to borrow additional funds so that they can consumeq = q . One can also show that the borrowing rate i m is zero. The reason is that demand for loans is relatively small and sellers o¤er all their money in the market for i m > 0. Market clearing then requires that i m = 0, and sellers are indi¤erent to how much money they o¤er. In equilibrium, they simply o¤er the amount requested by the buyers.
Finally, note that the type-IV equilibrium is identical under full and limited commitment. The reason is that the borrowing constraint is nonbinding under limited commitment.
Autarky punishment
So far, we have assumed that defaulters are excluded from borrowing and lending in the money market. We now propose an alternative punishment scheme in which defaulters are permanently excluded from both the money market and the goods market. Let us call this type of punishment autarky punishment.
There is a crucial di¤erence between the two schemes. This is best understood if we set the opportunity cost of holding money equal to zero (i = 0). In this case, agents can without cost selfinsure against the liquidity shocks that are present in the model, since holding money across periods is costless. Consequently, the baseline punishment of excluding agents from …nancial markets has no bite at i = 0. In contrast, the autarky punishment is still e¤ective at i = 0, since access to the goods market is valuable at i = 0.
A further di¤erence is that under the baseline punishment scheme, the punishment is increasing in i = 0 (at least for low values of i), while for the autarky punishment scheme, the punishment is decreasing in i. The reason is that, for the baseline punishment scheme, self-insurance becomes more costly as i increases. In contrast, for the autarky punishment scheme, the expected surplus from trading in the goods market is decreasing in i. The two punishments have, therefore, very di¤erent properties.
In the Appendix, we show how the autarky punishment scheme can be implemented, and we derive the following Lemma 2 Under an autarky punishment scheme, a buyer's real borrowing constraint is
Under an autarky punishment scheme, we identify the following sequence of equilibria: type-0, type-II, type-III, and type-IV. 20 Unlike the previous punishment, a buyer's borrowing constraint is now nonbinding for low enough policy rates (0 i i 0 ), and the economy is in the type-0 equilibrium in this region. This is, as discussed above, because the surplus from trading in the goods market is strictly positive even for low interest rates. Consequently, agents honor their obligations even in a low interest rate environment. Note that the expected surplus from trade in the goods market [u (q) q]+(1 ) [u (q) q] is always negatively related to the opportunity cost of holding money, and is maximized at i = 0.
This establishes an important di¤erence between the two punishment schemes: With autarky punishment, consumed quantities are always decreasing in i, while they can increase in i for the baseline punishment case (compare the right-hand diagrams in Figure 4 and 5). We have explained the reason for this further above. In Figure 5 , we compare the quantities of goods consumed by active and passive buyers as a function of the opportunity cost of holding money under full commitment and under autarky. It becomes clear that under the autarky punishment scheme, the allocation gets much closer to the full commitment case compared to our baseline punishment scheme. Since under autarky the punishment is always costly, …nancial intermediaries grant loans for any i > 0. Consequently, the type-I equilibrium ceases to exist. Finally, it is quite evident that if we were to introduce even more severe punishments for default, the allocation under limited commitment would approach the one under full commitment.
Liquidity trap
In the introduction, we discussed the liquidity trap and we quoted Keynes (1936) as saying that in a low interest rate environment agents are not willing to provide loans. We identi…ed limited commitment as the source of this phenomenon. m ) with the nominal interest rate. First, for low interest rates, no credit is available in the region labelled Type-I (the liquid trap). 21 It is clear by now that limited commitment is the cause for this scarcity of credit. Second, there is a strong positive correlation in the regions labelled Type-II and Type-III. The reason is also limited commitment, since in these regions the borrowing constraint (see the curve ~ m ) is binding. It is relaxed as the i increases and so more credit becomes available. Note that the baseline punishment scheme is crucial for this result. Further above, we have seen that with the autarky punishment borrowing and lending takes place even for low interest rates. This means that no liquidity trap exists under the autarky punishment scheme. Figure 6 displays borrowing as a function of the opportunity cost of holding money i with partial access (0 < < 1) under the baseline punishment scheme. The diagram on the left-hand side displays real borrowing `and the real borrowing constraint `. For 0 i i 1 , there is no borrowing and the money market shuts down no matter what the value of is. 22 For i 1 i i 2 , borrowing is constrained and rapidly increasing. It is rapidly increasing, because the increase in i relaxes the borrowing constraint. For i 2 i i 3 , borrowing is constrained and increasing, but with a smaller slope than in the region before. The reason is that the borrowing interest rate, i m , is increasing and increasing faster than i. For i i 3 , borrowing is unconstrained and decreasing in i. Here, the real balance e¤ect makes borrowing more expensive and so agents want to borrow less.
The diagram on the right-hand side displays the ratio `= m and the ratio `= m. The ratio `= m measures the ratio of credit to M1. As discussed in the introduction, the correlation between `= m and i is positive up to and including region III (whenever the borrowing constraint binds). Furthermore, since in these experiments we hold the quantity of money constant, the model also predicts a positive correlation between`and i for small opportunity costs (see the diagram on the right-hand side). Finally, we also observe a positive correlation between the real borrowing and i in these regions (see the left-hand-side diagram).
Quantitative Analysis
Hereafter, we calibrate our model to see how well our theoretical money demand function …ts the empirical money demand curve for the United Kingdom. In particular, we compare the …t of our limited commitment model to the …t of the same model under full commitment, and to the …ts of the two empirical methods proposed by Lucas (2000) . 23 Lucas (2000) explores the log-log and the semi-log speci…cations to …t the money demand curve. Under the log-log (semi-log) speci…cation money demand satis…es MD LL = Ai (MD SL = Ae i ). For both, we estimate the unknown parameters A and by minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between the model and the data.
The calibration of our models is a bit more evolved and we proceed as follows. First, we set a period length to one year and annualize all data accordingly. Second, we assume the following functional forms, u (q) = q 1 =(1 ), U (x) = A log(x), and c(q) = q. Third, we follow Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and choose a matching function of the form M(B; S) = BS=(B + S), where B = 1 n is the measure of buyers, and S = n is the measure of sellers.
Then, we identify the following set of parameters: (i) preference parameters , A, and ; (ii) technology parameters n and ; (iii) the bargaining weight, ; and (iv) the policy parameter, i. The parameters are identi…ed using quarterly U.K. data, from 1986 to 2013. 24 The policy parameter i = 0:062 matches the average annual yield on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years. 25 The preference parameter = (1 + r) 1 = 0:968 is chosen such that the real interest rate in the model, r = 0:034, replicates the empirical one, which is measured as the di¤erence between the average annual yield on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years and the annual change in the consumer price index. The technology parameter n is set to maximize the number of matches; i.e., n = 0:5. The remaining unknown parameters A, , , and , are identi…ed by minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between the model-implied and the observed money demand, and by matching the goods market mark-up simultaneously. The demand for money in the model is given by (23) , while the goods market mark-up is the weighted average of the real money holdings divided by the production cost in this market, = g(q)=c(q) + (1 ) g(q)=c(q) 1. The target value for the goods market mark-up of = 0:15 is borrowed from Martins et al. (1996) . The calibration and simulation results for our model with full commitment and limited commitment, as well as for the two speci…cations by Lucas (2000) , are shown in Table 2 . 2 3 Recall that under full commitment for 0 < i < iF , the type-0 equilibrium exists, and for i > iF , the type-IV equilibrium exists. The demand for money under full commitment still satis…es (23) . 2 4 The data source is provided in the Appendix. For consistency, all data used in this paper is obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis FRED database. As the quarterly time series for M1 for the U.K. is only available for the post-1985 period, we focus on this sample period in the entire paper. 2 5 Related studies work with the AAA rate, which represents the yield on corporate bonds with a remaining maturity of 20 years. See, for instance, Berentsen et al. (2011 Berentsen et al. ( , 2014 Berentsen et al. ( , and 2015 and Aruoba et al. (2011) . However, since we perform a cross-country analysis, we decided to use the yield on 10-year government bonds in order to have a comparable data set. Table 2 shows that our model with limited commitment succeeds best in replicating the data; i.e., it yields the smallest sum of squared di¤erences between the theoretical money demand curve and the data. For limited commitment, the resulting welfare cost of in ‡ation is around 12 percent, which is of similar magnitude to the values obtained under the other speci…cations. 26 The welfare cost of in ‡ation in the United Kingdom is much higher than, say, in the United States. The reason is that money demand in the United Kingdom is larger than that in the United States by roughly a factor of 10.
Under limited commitment, the calibrated money market access probability is = 0:625, while with full commitment we obtain = 0 (no …nancial intermediation). This clearly contradicts the facts, since there is a highly developed …nancial sector in the United Kingdom, and so we disregard the full commitment model. Furthermore, the log-log and the semi-log speci…cation do less well in replicating the empirical money demand function as compared to our model with limited commitment.
A further observation that supports our …nding that limited commitment is important in the United Kingdom is the correlation between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates, which is 0:93 for the private non…nancial sector. Our model with limited commitment comes very close to this estimate and produces a value of 0:89, while we obtain a value of 0 under full commitment since = 0. 2 6 For both the full commitment and limited commitment models, we calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the percentage of total consumption that agents would be willing to give up in order to be in a steady state with a nominal interest rate of 3 percent instead of 13 percent. For the log-log and the semi-log speci…cation, we follow Lucas (2000) and calculate the welfare cost of in ‡ation as the area underneath the money demand function for interest rates between 3 and 13 percent. In Figure 7 , we show the money demand curves for the four di¤erent speci…cations mentioned above. It combines Figure 1 and Figure 2 , and therefore we do not discuss it here again.
Robustness
In order to verify that limited commitment also improves the …t of money demand for other countries in addition to that of U.K., we now present our numerical results for Australia, Canada and the United States. For these countries we found a comparable data set for the same sample period. As before, we use quarterly data from 1986 to 2013 and set i equal to the average annual rate on government bonds with a maturity of 10 years, while we choose = (1 + r)
1 such that the model replicates the real interest rate in the data, measured as the di¤erence between i and the average annual in ‡ation rate. Furthermore, we keep the technology parameter n = 0:5 in order to maximize the number of matches. Finally, we calibrate the unknown parameters A, , , and , by minimizing the sum of squared di¤erences between the model-implied and the observed money demand, and by matching the goods market mark-up simultaneously.
Australia
For Australia, we obtain the following targets: i = 0:074 and = (1 + r) 1 = 0:962, where r = 0:040.
Martins et al. (1996) provide an average mark-up of 17 percent for Australia, which we use as a calibration target. Table 3 summarizes the calibration and simulation results. Table 3 is Table 2 's counterpart for Australia. For a description of the reported variables, we refer the reader to Table 2 .
As for the United Kingdom, we …nd for Australia that our model with limited commitment succeeds best in replicating the data; i.e., we obtain a sum of squared di¤erences between the theoretical money demand and the data of 0:28 as compared to 0:43 for the semi-log speci…cation (second-best …t). Furthermore, Table 3 shows that limited commitment signi…cantly reduces the welfare cost of in ‡ation. We obtain 1:9 percent under limited commitment, whereas the other three methods result in estimates between 2:6 and 3:7 percent. As for the United Kingdom, we …nd for the calibration under full commitment that = 0 results in the best …t between the model and the data. That is, our model with full commitment suggests that Australia does not have any …nancial intermediation, which strongly contradicts the reality. Figure 8 shows that limited commitment does a good job in replicating the low elasticity of money demand for low nominal interest rates and the high elasticity for intermediate nominal interest rates, whereas the standard methods fail to replicate this relationship. As for the United Kingdom, we …nd for Australia a positive relationship between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates. Concretely, the correlation between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates is 0:35 for the private non…nancial sector, while our model estimates a value of 0:97.
Canada
For Canada, we obtain the following targets: i = 0:060 and = (1 + r) 1 = 0:965, where r = 0:036.
Martins et al. (1996) provide an average mark-up of 20 percent for Canada, which we use as a calibration target. Table 4 summarizes the calibration and simulation results. Table 4 is Table 2 's counterpart for Canada.
The log-log speci…cation replicates the data best, followed by our model with full commitment. Limited commitment does not improve the …t when compared to these methods. Furthermore, for limited commitment the optimal money market access probability is = 0. This is odd, since in the Canadian data we observe a positive correlation between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates, which equals 0:73 for the private non…nancial sector. This …nding suggests that limited commitment also a¤ects the Canadian economy, but that our calibration is not able to identify it.
When we look at the data, it becomes clear that Canada exhibits a very elastic money demand for very low interest rates (see Figure 9 ). However, our calibration implies that the type-II equilibrium (where money demand is highly elastic) only prevails for higher nominal interest rates. As a robustness check we recalibrate the limited commitment model for lower values of r. From the theoretical section, recall that only the borrowing limit depends directly on r:
Note that neither the model with full commitment nor the Lucas speci…cations are a¤ected by a change in r, and so we can continue to compare the results for di¤erent values of r with those in Table 4 . Note also, from (25) , that decreasing r a¤ects the borrowing limit in the same way as lowering n or increasing and so instead of using r we could also use these parameter for our robustness check. We present our …ndings for lower values of r in Table 5 . Table 5 shows the calibration results for Canada under limited commitment for di¤erent values of the real interest rate r. Table 5 shows that our model replicates the data very well for lower values of r. In particular, for r = 0:020, we …nd that the model with limited commitment provides a better …t than all other methods. Furthermore, for r = 0:020 the correlation between the ratio of credit to M1 and nominal interest rates in the model is 0:88, which comes close to its empirical counterpart of 0:73. As mentioned above, we could have also decreased n or increased to obtain a better …t for the limited commitment model for Canada.
Beside this, we …nd that for any real interest rate that results in a strictly positive access probability, the estimated welfare cost of in ‡ation is signi…cantly lower than the values obtained by the traditional methods. For instance, for r = 0:025 we …nd an optimal value of the money market access probability of = 0:825 and a welfare cost of in ‡ation of = 0:021, whereas the three other methods result in estimates of the welfare cost of in ‡ation between 3:6 and 6 percent. For ease of understanding, we show in Figure 10 the resulting money demand curves for di¤erent values of r. The above …gure shows that for lower values of the real interest rate, the critical value i 1 moves to the left, which improves the …t with the data. To summarize, we …nd that our model proves competent in replicating the Canadian data well, if we assume a real interest rate of 0:020 r < 0:030, which results in a highly elastic money demand curve for low nominal interest rates.
United States
For the United States, we obtain the following targets: i = 0:055 and = (1 + r) 1 = 0:974, where r = 0:026. Martins et al. (1996) provide an average mark-up of 15 percent for the United States, which we use as a calibration target. Table 6 summarizes the calibration and simulation results. Table 6 is Table 2 's counterpart for the United States.
For the United States, limited commitment does not improve the …t between the theoretical money demand function and its empirical counterpart and the log-log speci…cation succeeds best in replicating the data (see Table 6 and Figure 11 ). Table 6 also shows that all methods imply a low welfare cost of in ‡ation, ranging from 0:3 and 0:4 percent. Furthermore, we obtain a positive money market access probability under full commitment which equals = 0:375, whereas limited commitment results in = 0. This calibration result does not imply that limited commitment is unimportant for the United States. It only means that our model is not able to identify it. One reason could be that for the U.S. we do not capture the legal system as represented by our punishment scheme very well. For example, in the theory section, we showed that the allocation under limited commitment gets close to the one under full commitment if we assume a more severe punishment scheme. Another reason is that …nancial regulations and …nancial innovations also a¤ect the money demand function (see the discussion in the literature section) and that these innovations are more important to explain U.S. money demand (see Berentsen et al. 2015 ).
Conclusion
Using a "New Monetarist" approach, we build a model that incorporates a money market where agents can borrow and deposit money. We …rst show in theory how limited commitment a¤ects the relationship between money demand and nominal interest rates. We then calibrate the model and demonstrate that limited commitment signi…cantly improves the …t between the theoretical money demand function and the historical money demand data for the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada in the post-1985 period. Our model also implies that there is a positive correlation between nominal interest rates and credit activity, a …nding that is consistent with the data of the three analyzed countries. Standard models, which assume full commitment of borrowers via banks, have a hard time in replicating this fact.
